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Mara Hart*
I. THE MORTGAGE LENDING STRUCTURE IN THE UNITED
STATES & THE UNITED KINGDOM
The recent downturn of the global economy, spurred in large part by
an unparalleled housing crisis and credit crunch in the United States and
abroad, cannot be practicably understood or explained by an examination of
isolated factors. Although the impact of the economic downturn has been
felt globally, many blame the meltdown of the U.S. subprime mortgage
market for their individual country's woes.'
Therefore, the mortgage regulatory scheme in the United States, in
terms of lending practices and housing policies, is an important place to
begin an inquiry into the origins of the global crisis. In order to better
understand how the lending practices in the United States may have
contributed to the housing crisis, and furthermore, to hypothesize potential
solutions to prevent such events from recurring, it is valuable to examine
the housing and lending policies of other economies.2 This paper aims to
J.D. Candidate, 2010, Northwestern University School of Law.
1 Memorandum from the Bovis Homes Co. to Parliament on the U.K. Housing Market
(Oct. 2008), available at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.com/pa/cm2007O8/cmselect/cmcomloc/memo/housecredit/ucml802.htm.
2 See, e.g., Richard Snook, Birthplace of the Blues: The US. Housing Crisis, BUILDING,
Oct. 31, 2008, available at
http://www.building.co.uk.regen-story.asp?sectioncode=331&storycode=3126226&c=2
("[Clharting the progress of the housing downturn in the U.S., and the parallels with the UK,
is an important step in understanding the prospects for economic recovery."). But see
Isabelle Job, US. Housing Crisis Special Features Not Generally Present in Europe, Credit
Agricole S.A. Economic Research Department, Nov. 25, 2008, available at http://economic-
research.credit-agricole.com/medias/EN1 19_EN.pdf (stating that there are risks in
comparing the economies of the United States with that of Europe because of inherent
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compare and contrast certain aspects of generally accepted lending practices
in the United States and the United Kingdom, including recent changes in
regulation that are targeted at making the lending process more transparent.
The ultimate conclusion of this inquiry is that the time has arrived for the
United States to look across the Atlantic for inspiration in terms of
regulating mortgages.
The framework of mortgage policy and practice in the United States is
created by a complex intersection of state laws, federal agency regulations,
the United States central banking system, and underlying public policy.4 In
the United Kingdom, the Financial Services Authority ("FSA") regulates
and supervises all financial services firms, but other governmental agencies
have simultaneous roles. The resulting scheme of policy and regulation is
intricate, though certainly more consolidated than that of the United States.s
A background analysis of the housing and mortgage markets, the
relevant regulatory bodies, and the current policies related to mortgages in
both countries is essential in attempting to isolate specifically how home
selling practices contributed to the overall mortgage meltdown.6 The
relative opaqueness of the U.K. lending market compared to the U.S.
market, due to both industry structure and regulatory framework, has led to
a relative resiliency to the market downturn in the United Kingdom.
Therefore, this paper argues that the U.S. housing and mortgage lending
market would be relatively improved by adopting U.K. mortgage brokerage
and lending practices.
A. Comparing the Housing Markets
The mortgage industries in the United States and the United Kingdom
face similar challenges, which allows us to compare the regulatory
differences in the countries' respective markets).
3 See id.
4 See, e.g., Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3616a (1968); Truth In Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1601 (codified, as amended, at 12 C.F.R. Part 226).
s U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN
AFFAIRS, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN ON FINANCIAL REGULATION: INDUSTRY CHANGES
PROMPT NEED TO RECONSIDER U.S. REGULATORY STRUCTURE, at 67 (2004), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0561.pdf.
6 Here, we will confine our inquiry to the mortgage lending and brokerage practices in
both countries, although there are a wide variety of regulatory failures which prompted the
subprime mortgage crisis and related credit crunch. In the United States, for example, many
argue that the primary tipping point for the meltdown was the federal government
sponsorship of mortgage lending giants Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. See, e.g., Charles
Duhigg, Pressured to Take Risk, Fannie Reached Tipping Point, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/05/business/05fannie.html?_r-1 &em. In the United
Kingdom, many point to the lack of liquidity as the main cause of the crisis. Anatole
Kaletsky, Loss of Liquidity, Not Insolvency, Caused Credit Crunch, TIMES (London), Mar.




structures with conviction. There has been a remarkable similarity in the
evolution of house prices in both countries, charted over the past twenty
years, with peak prices reaching 125% over 2000 levels in the United
States, and 135% over these levels in the United Kingdom.8 Additionally,
such growth has accelerated since 2000, with strong economic expansion in
both countries driving consistent speculation of continuation of this upward
trend.9 The increasing prices coupled with, until recently, relatively easy
credit, has led to widespread mortgage growth in this time frame, and in
many cases growth has occurred regardless of whether those receiving the
mortgages could actually afford them.'0 In what has proven to be an
unprecedented housing bubble burst, home sales began their rapid descent
in the United States in early 2006, and in late 2007 in the United
Kingdom." The insulation of the U.K housing market from the downturn,
as seen b' this delay, is likely evidence of the effectiveness of its regulatory
scheme.'
The actual nuts and bolts of the mortgage lending practices in the two
countries also have similarities.' 3 Very generally, both countries' mortgage
industries rely heavily on the role of the mortgage broker to facilitate loans
between lenders and borrowers.14  In the United States, there were
approximately 53,000 mortgage brokerage companies that employed over
418,000 employees, which originated 68% of all residential loans in the
United States in 2004." So long as the broker is adequately licensed 6 or
certified,17 the arrangement between lender and broker allows the lending
7 Henry Paulson, U.S. Treas. Sec'y, Remarks on the U.S., The World Economy and
Markets before the Chatham House (July 2, 2008), available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1064.htm.
8 Snook, supra note 2.
9 Id.
'o See id
" The housing downturn in the United States was seen as early as 2005, and soon after in
the United Kingdom. See, e.g., Alan Greenspan, Reflections on Central Banking at a
Symposium Sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank (Aug. 26, 2005), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/Boarddocs/Speeches/2005/20050826/default.htm; Grainne
Gilmore, House Sales Slow as Prices Continue to Fall, THE TIMEs, May 31, 2008.
12 See infra part II.B. of this article for further discussion.
'3 Jack Guttentag, Mortgage Brokers in the UK Versus the US, June 2, 2008,
http://www.mtgprofessor.com/A%20-%2OMortgage%20Brokers/brokers%20in%2OUK.htm.
14 id
15 Access Mortgage Research & Consulting, Inc., Study of the Mortgage Broker Business
and Industry (2008), referenced at http://www.allbusiness.com/personal-finance/real-estate-
mortgage-loans/717357-1.html.
16 See American Mortgage Licensing, State Requirements for Brokers,
http://www.amlicensing.com/state.asp.
17 See Financial Services Authority, Training and Competence Sourcebook, CP1 86 6.1 at
14, available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/CPl94.pdf (stating that an examination will
be required for certain mortgage activities including advised mortgage sales).
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industry to function with flexibility and efficiency.18 The lender provides
the broker with specific loan prices and eligibility requirements, and the
broker seeks customers that fit this description and are willing to pay the
required price.'9
This basic brokerage structure exists in both the United States and the
United Kingdom, giving lenders the advantage of a broad customer base
and immediate responsiveness to changes in supply and demand; when the
lender wishes to cut volume, they are free to simply increase prices or
tighten their eligibility standards. 2  Thus they are rarely forced to lay off
employees, since brokers act as independent contractors. In both countries,
the lender, rather than the borrower, most commonly pays brokers.2 1
Differences abound, however. First of all, the supply markets don't
exactly translate. Land supply is abundant in the United States versus most
European countries including the United Kingdom, and population density
in the United States is only a fraction of that in the United Kingdom.22 This
creates very different supply and demand structures; some commentators
note that the housing problems in the United States have stemmed from a
well-documented over-supply, whereas U.K. housing problems have
historically been linked to under-supply. 23
The result of this supply-side difference is that the United States has a
larger back stock of unsold homes, which one estimate says is over 4.7
million units, versus 700,000 in the United Kingdom.24 Not surprisingly, in
a time of flat economic growth and largely unavailable credit, excess
25inventory can only mean one thing for housing prices: steep declines.
Secondly, although housing prices in both countries are historically
high, there are differences in mortgage lending practices, fee structure for
mortgage brokers, and consumer awareness policies. The main difference
is that, in the United Kingdom, prices quoted by lenders directly to
borrowers are the same retail prices available to borrowers through
mortgage brokers.2 6 These prices are generally public information and are
18 Jack Guttentag, Why Fees For Mortgage Brokers Differ Between US and England,
DAILY HERALD (Aug. 2, 2008), www.dailyherald.com/story/print/?id=224978.
'9 Id.
20 Guttentag, supra note 13.
21 See id.
22 Tiffany Chaney & Paul Emrath, U.S. vs. European Housing Markets, NAT'L Ass'N OF
HOME BUILDERS (May 5, 2006),
http://www.nahb.org/generic.aspx?genericContentlD=5741 1&print-true.
23 Bovis, supra note 1.
24 Snook, supra note 2, at 2.
25 See, e.g., The Long Hangover, EcONOMIST (Apr. 10, 2008), available at
http://www.economist.com/world/unitedstates/displaystory.cfmn?storyid=11016296 ("[T]he
frailty of demand means that supply still vastly outweighs sales . . . [t]he excess of supply
over demand means that the fall in house prices is accelerating.").




available on lenders' websites and through various media outlets.27 All
eligible borrowers theoretically have access to the same information about
prices, and are assured that they can receive the advertised price from any
broker that does business with the particular lender.28  Armed with this
information, borrowers can be assured they are on equal footing with other
borrowers of the same general credit rating, and are not left wondering how
their brokers are compensated.
The U.S. lender-broker arrangement is markedly different. Lenders
deliver wholesale prices confidentially to those brokers with whom they do
business. 29 These brokers add their own individually designed mark-ups to
the wholesale price before quoting whole prices to borrowers, never
disclosing the actual lender-originated wholesale price.30 For example, a
wholesale price given by a lender may be seven percent and zero points, to
which the broker adds a two point markup.31 The total resultant price to the
borrower is seven percent and two points (i.e. each point is equal to one
percent of the loan amount). This markup will traditionally be as high as
the broker can get away with without losing the customer and forfeiting any
32fee income.
Brokers are therefore compensated by the spread between the
wholesale price quoted by the lender and the retail price that the customer is
willing to pay.33 This structure creates incentives to raise markups as high
as the market will allow.34 In addition, this pricing scheme leads many
borrowers to assume, mistakenly, that the brokers are working in the
borrower's best interest, attempting to snag them the lowest interest rate
available for their particular credit rating. As brokers are often
compensated by the spread, this simply isn't the case. Furthermore, the









3 See Federal Reserve System, Final Rule, Official Staff Commentary, 70 Fed. Reg. 147,
44522, 44525 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 226) (suggesting anecdotal evidence which
indicates that consumers in both the prime and subprime markets often believe, in error, that
a mortgage broker is obligated to find the consumer the best and most suitable loan terms
available, and stating:
Consumers who rely on brokers often are unaware, however, that a broker's
interests may diverge from, and conflict with, their own interests. In particular,
consumers are often unaware that a creditor pays a broker more to originate a loan
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First, price information for the subprime market is not widely and
readily available to consumers . .. [S]ubprime rates, which can vary
significantly based on the individual borrower's risk profile, are not
broadly advertised and are usually obtainable only after application
and paying a fee. Subprime rate quotes may not even be reliable if
the originator engages in a "bait and switch" strategy. Price opacity
is exacerbated because the subprime consumer often does not know
her own credit score. Even if she knows her score, the prevailing
interest rate for someone with that score and other credit risk
characteristics is not generally publicly available.36
Moreover, the payment structure between lenders and brokers differs. In
the United Kingdom, payments to brokers are set by lenders and are fairly
standardized and are provided in detail to borrowers at the outset. In
addition, brokers must disclose to lenders exactly what the arrangements are
with the lenders that they recommend, in detail.37 These rates do not vary
with the interest rate obtained for the loan.38 Alternatively, U.S. brokers are
paid based on the interest rates they can deliver to the borrower. That is,
they are paid only with a commission based on this spread with no salary
component. 39  This difference in pay structure affects the incentives of
mortgage intermediaries such as brokers and a praisers, contributing to the
overall lack of transparency in the U.S. market.
Although some brokers will standardize a fee (i.e. the "yield spread
premium"), the common practice among most brokers is to charge the
highest rate the market will allow. 4 1 Recent regulation in the United States
has focused on this facet of the pricing structure as it relates to transparency
in lending. Further discussion of such regulation changes by both the
Federal Reserve Board and the Housing and Urban Development Agency
("HUD") are discussed in Part II.
The structure of the pricing scheme between mortgage lenders and
brokers in the United States leaves ample room and temptation for
36 See id.
37 See Financial Services Authority Factsheet, FSA regulation of mortgage arranging and
advising - do I need to be authorised?,
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/smallfirms/resources/factsheets/pdfs/mortgagearranging.pdf;
Moneymadeclear, Getting Help From a Mortgage Broker,
http://www.moneymadeclear.fsa.gov.uk/products/mortgages/help/gettinghelpfrom_a_mort
gage broker.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2010).
38 See Guttentag, supra note 13.
3 Itzhak Ben-David, Financial Constraints, Inflated Home Prices, and Borrower Default
During the Real-Estate Boom (Fisher College of Business Working Paper Series 2009-03-
001, 2009), 21 available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=991387.
4o See id. at 10 (stating that the compensation structure for mortgage brokers is such that
their ultimate goal is to complete each transaction, and often at a higher price, regardless of
the interests of the borrower or the bank).




opportunistic pricing.42 This structure helps to explain perhaps why the
average markup of the loan price from lender to broker to borrower in the
United States is nearly twice that of the United Kingdom.4 3 Some argue
that the practices of mortgage lenders and brokers in the United States have
led to a breakdown in the quality of loan underwriting in the market,
leading at least in part to the subprime crisis and the mortgage meltdown.44
Although others contend that the mortgage brokerage system in the United
States is the answer to creation of a healthy and efficient mortgage
marketplace, the recent market meltdown suggests otherwise. 45
Lending practices in the United Kingdom are strikingly more
transparent and consumer-friendly.4 6 Interestingly, the housing market
meltdown reached the United Kingdom later than the United States, and
conditions still appear to be better despite the interconnectedness of the
world economy. Economists predict a sharper recovery in the United
Kingdom than the United States, citing the fact that the U.S. recovery will
require jumping two large hurdles: a complete rejuvenation of the mortgage
market, as well as the completion of a massive sale of the large back stock
of homes currently dragging down the supply side of the housing market.48
The United Kingdom, however, does not have a similar overabundance
of homes for current sale in the market, which places the U.K. housing
market in a better position to recover equilibrium.49 It is perhaps time for
the United States to realign its mortgage lending and brokerage regulations
to follow the more transparent and conservative lead of the United
Kingdom.
B. Regulatory Framework for Mortgage Lenders and Brokers
The regulatory scheme facing mortgage lenders and brokers is
considerably different in the United States and in the United Kingdom.50
The following section will provide a background and overview of these
42 See Ben-David, supra note 39, at 20 (stating that brokers "therefore have an incentive
to help potential buyers find creative solutions for their credit constraints" . . . [flurthermore,
[brokers] have the advantage of being "familiar with the techniques of and possibilities for
exploiting creative funding opportunities").
43 See Guttentag, supra note 13.
4 See id.
45 See Jack Guttentag, Seattle Mortgage Broker Follows U.K. Model, CHICAGO DAILY
HERALD (Aug. 10, 2008), [hereinafter Guttentag, Seattle].
46 See id (stating that the system in the Unite Kingdom does not leave room for
opportunistic pricing by lenders and brokers the way that the system in the United States
necessarily does).
47 See Bovis, supra note 1 (stating that the crisis hit the United States in 2005, whereas
the United Kingdom was not truly impacted until late in 2007).
48 See Snook, supra note 2.
49 See id.
50 Guttentag, Seattle, supra note 45.
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differences.
In 2000, Parliament passed the Financial Services and Markets Act in
the United Kingdom.51 This Act essentially created and gave considerable
authority to the FSA, whose general duty is to instill market confidence,
create public awareness, protect consumers, and reduce financial crime.52
As part and parcel of these duties, the FSA was charged with regulating and
supervising every person who carries on a regulated financial activity in the
United Kingdom.5 While the FSA is the sole financial services supervisor
in the United Kingdom, there are still other governmental entities that
contribute to the regulatory framework for the lending and housing market.
For example, a three-part agreement lays out the simultaneous duties of the
Bank of England, Her Majesty's Treasury ("HM-Treasury"), and the FSA.54
The FSA, a non-governmental body, answers to both the Treasury and
Parliament.
In 2004, the FSA took over regulation of the mortgage industry,
inclusive of mortgage brokers. 56 This consolidation of authority had the
happy result of bringing all mortgage brokers in the country under one set
of rules. For instance, if a consumer has a complaint against a broker, there
is one agency with which to file a complaint.57
Acting under this general grant of supervisory power over the industry,
the FSA put requirements in place that all brokers must pass a competency
exam in order to practice, and must provide all borrowers with three
specific disclosures upon commencing business with them.5 8 The first, the
Initial Disclosure Document, is provided to the borrower after the
borrower's initial meeting with the broker.5 9 This document describes the
lenders to which the broker has access, and provides complete information
about the broker's fee, amount payable, and how it relates to the lender.60
There is no comparable document in the United States.
The second disclosure is entitled the "Key Facts Illustration," which
the broker provides to the borrower once a desirable loan package has been
identified, and which lays out estimates of the true cost of the loan, payment
5' Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, (Eng.).
52 See Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 1.2, (Eng.), available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ACTS/acts2000/ukpga_20000008_en_2#ptl-llgl.
5 See Financial Services Authority, Do I Need to be Authorised?,
www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/Doing/Do/index.shtml.
54 Clive Bruilt, Financial Services Authority, The Rationale for a Single National
Financial Services Regulator, Occasional Paper Series No. 2 (May 1999), at 8.









schedules, and any other fees related to the loan.6' Lastly, the broker
provides a "Mortgage Record of Suitability," which states the borrower's
specific traits that bear on the mortgage selection, as well as important
features of the recommended loan including current and future affordability
to the borrower.62
The regulatory scheme facing mortgage lenders and brokers in the
United States is considerably more convoluted, while at the same time less
stringent. Although mortgage brokers are regulated by more than ten
federal laws, five federal enforcement agencies and at least forty-nine state
regulation and licensing statutes, the have considerably more flexibility in
pricing than their U.K. counterparts.
There are several main regulatory bodies with which brokers must
comply. HUD, which was created in 1965 as a cabinet-level agency to
increase home ownership and increase access to affordable housing, has
participated in the mortgage industry regulatory scheme to the extent that
lending impacts housing policies. 64 Some argue that the mortgage policies
of HUD have fueled the trend towards issuance of risky loans, putting its
policy objectives of increasing home ownership ahead of responsible
lending practices.65
In the United States, mortgage brokers are required to obtain separate
licenses for every state in which they wish to operate. Indeed, this is a key
advantage to lenders to utilize brokers - their ability to seek business in
other states than that in which the lender operates.67 However, this
requirement subjects the broker to different rules by state, leading to less
than clear-cut standard industry practice with which consumers must
grapple. 68  All brokers are subject to the federal Truth in Lending Act
("TILA"), which provides another layer of regulation on required
disclosures and consumer rights.6 9 The provisions of TILA and its recent
amendments will be discussed further in Part III.
61 See id.
62 See id.
63 National Association of Mortgage Brokers, The Regulation and Oversight of the
Mortgage Broker Industry, www.namb.org,
http://www.namb.org/Images/namb/GovernmentAffairs/WordFromWashington/WFW%2
02006-11%20(Regulation%20of/o20Brokers).pdf.
6 Department of Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. 3532-3537
(1965).
65 See id.
66 See Guttentag, Seattle, supra note 45.
67 See Guttentag, supra note 13.
68 See id.
69 See 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000) (The regulations implementing the statute, which are
known as "Regulation Z", are codified at 12 CFR Part 22615 §226.1).
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C. Taxation Policies Lead to Differing Incentives
A final difference between the policies and practices of the mortgage
industries in the United States and the United Kingdom is the tax code. The
U.S. income tax code gives owner-occupied housing advantages such as a
mortgage interest payment deduction.70 In 2006, Congress estimated that
the tax savings enjoyed by U.S. citizens for this deduction was $402.7
billion over five years.7 1 This considerable sum is borne by the government
under the assumption that incentivizing home purchase is a beneficial
public policy to increase home ownership.72 Some argue, however, that
consumers end up just buying larger homes with more amenities instead of
actually making home purchase decisions that they would not have made
without the tax break.
By way of contrast, the U.K does not have a mortgage interest
deduction in place.74 However, there is dissent among economists because
whereas some data suggests that home ownership rates are not directly
correlated with whether or not countries provide such deductions, other
empirical studies suggest tax deductions significantly influence mortgage
decisions.
II. THE SUBPRIME CRISIS & DECEPTIVE LENDING PRACTICES
A. Background
The economic downturn and so-called housing crisis in the past few
years can attribute a significant portion of their origin to two recent market
phenomena: a considerable decline in housing prices and the related
mortgage payment delinquencies and foreclosures. In 2005 to 2006, the
housing "bubble" which existed in the United States burst when defaults on
subprime mortgages and adjustable rate mortgages began to climb at
alarming rates.7 The subprime share of the loan market reached about 9%
in 2001, and reached 20% in both 2005 and 2006. This widespread
increase of risky mortgages increased home ownership across the United





7 Pamela J. Jackson, Fundamental Tax Reform: Options for the Mortgage Interest
Deduction, Cong. Res. Serv. RL33025 (2005), available at
http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalinklmeta-crs-7300: 1.
76 Rex Nutting, Recession Will Be Nasty and Deep, Economist Says, MarketWatch, Aug.
23, 2006, available at http://www.marketwatch.com/story/coming-recession-will-be-nastier-
than-200 Is-economist-says.
77 Federal Reserve System, Final Rule, Official Staff Commentary, 70 Fed. Reg. 147,





States, but the public policy benefits of this trend quickly eroded as it
became evident that the risk of these loans was no distant illusion. 9 For
example, the proportion of all subprime mortgages past-due for ninety days
or more ("serious delinquency") was about 18% in May 2008, over three
times higher than the 2005 level.80  Adjustable-rate subprime mortgages
have performed the worst, reaching a serious delinquency rate of 27% in
May 2008.8' Although many factors are blamed for the depth and breadth
of this crisis, chief among these factors are poor judgments made by
borrowers and lenders alike.
B. Global Housing Boom ... and Bust
Many observers in the United Kingdom predicted that the subprime
market collapse would have a lesser impact on the housing market in the
United Kingdom than was being seen in the United States.8 3 There are
several reasons for believing that the situation here is very different from
that in the United States. First, subprime lending constituted a significantly
smaller proportion of the total mortgage market as of 2007.84 Second, U.S.
borrowers have been subject to a series of rapid interest rate increases,
resulting in borrowing costs rising from one to 5.25% over the short span of
two years. 5 Contrastingly, U.K. interest rates were relatively stable over
the same period of time.
In addition, lending practices of U.S. subprime mortgage lenders
added to the pain by offering low rates for initial teaser periods-tpically
about two years-before resetting to much higher fixed-term rates.8 Third,
house prices in the United States were rapidly falling as early as 2007,
leaving thousands of mortgage holders with negative equity (i.e., borrowers
owe more on their mortgage than the underlying property is worth) and
7 See Nutting, supra note 76.
80 See id.
81 See id.
82 Joseph Stiglitz, Commentary, How to Prevent the Next Wall Street Crisis, CNN NEWS
SERVICES, Sept. 17, 2008, available at
http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/09/17/stiglitz.crisis/index.html.
83 Jane Padgham & Robert Griffin, UK Can Avoid U.S.-Style Mortgage Crisis, THE
INDEPENDENT, Mar. 16, 2007, available at
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/analysis-and-features/uk-can-avoid-U.S.style-
mortgage-crisis-440480.html.
84 Id. (stating that "Merrill Lynch has estimated that it was worth £25bn to f30bn in
2005, but the Council of Mortgage Lending puts the figure at a much smaller £15bn to
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unable to sell their homes to pay off their debts." In the United Kingdom,
however, a long-running housing boom remained intact at that point in
time.89 What observers failed to appreciate, however, was that the United
Kingdom was still vulnerable to the crisis in the United States because U.K.
banks had huge capital obligations covering the subprime loan mess in the
United States. o For example, as of February 2007, British bank HSBC had
set aside $10.5bn (E5.4bn) to cover bad loans in the United States.91
Unfortunately, the subprime meltdown in the United States had a
ripple effect throughout the global economy, resulting in a wave of damage
to financial institutions and investors around the world.92 Because debt
instruments backed by subprime mortgages were purchased worldwide, the
International Monetary Fund noted that worldwide losses stemming from
the U.S. crisis could reach $945 billion.93 By January, global financial
institutions had announced more than $135 billion of write-downs and
losses.94 In March of 2008, the largest bank in the United Kingdom, HSBC,
reported a loss of $17.2 billion due to its exposure to the U.S. housing
95crisis.
The housing market downturn in the United Kingdom is wholly
without precedent. In a report released in the fall of 2008, mortgage
approvals for house purchases fell 75% and housing prices fell 14% over
the previous two years.96 Falling volumes and falling prices have in turn
led to sharply reduced land values, making impracticable the continuation
of many planned housing developments. The price and volume reductions
in the current housing market have triggered deej concern and
parliamentary response, discussed below in Part III. Interestingly,
88 id.
89 Padgham & Griffin, supra note 83.
90 See, e.g. Andrew Clark, Barclays Sues Over Sub-Prime Losses, THE GUARDIAN, Dec.
20, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2007/dec/20/barclaysbusiness.subprimecrisis
(discussing Barclay's exposure to the US subprime losses).
91 Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, U.S. Mortgage Crisis Goes Into Meltdown, TELEGRAPH,
Feb. 27, 2007, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2804846/U.S.-mortgage-
crisis-goes-into-meltdown.html.
92 See Nutting, supra note 76.
93 Findfacts Team, IMF Says Worldwide Losses Stemming from the US. Subprime
Mortgage Crisis Could Reach $945 Billion, Apr. 8, 2008,
http://www.finfacts.com/irishfinancenews/article1013133.shtml.
94 Julia Werdigier, Trading scandal diverts attention from Societe Generale's subprime
losses, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 29, 2008, available at
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/01/29/business/loss.php.
9 See BBC News, HSBC in $17bn credit crisis loss, Mar. 3, 2008, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilbusiness/7274385.stm.
96 See Bovis, supra note 1 (stating that the current market downturn is markedly worse
than that of the late 1980s, in which mortgage approvals fell by 60% and housing prices fell





however, only a small portion of the housing downturn in the United
Kingdom has been attributed to subprime mortgage lending practices there,
or to poor regulatory oversight of mortgages; the U.S. subprime market is
blamed for most of the problems.
Expectations for recovery are nowhere in the foreseeable future, with
the rate of new home construction expected to fall steeply in the coming
years.99 Experts at the United Kingdom's largest building society expect
housing prices to continue to fall by 1% to 1.5% a month for the rest of
2008, and to continue falling at this rate in coming years.1oo However, the
Bank of England reports that the housing market is showing signs of
stabilization; the number of mortgages approved to finance house purchases
was broadly unchanged as of September 2008, for the third successive
month. o0
C. In the Wake of Crisis: Lawsuits and Blame
There is an abundance of litigation underway in response to the
subprime crisis. One study released in early 2008 estimated that over 250
civil lawsuits had already commenced in 2007 related to subprime lending
activities, a large percentage of which were class action suits brought by
borrowers contending they were victims of discriminatory lending
practices.102
In the United States, the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act
9 See, e.g., Mark Landler, Housing Woes in US. Spread Across Globe, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
14, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/14/business/worldbusiness/14real.html?ref-business; but
see The Bust Begins, ECONOMIsT, Apr. 8, 2008,
http://www.economist.com/world/britain/displaystory.cfm?storyid=11001376, pointing to
another possible cause:
[A] study by the International Monetary Fund found that Britain's housing market
was the third most over-valued of 17 developed economies, narrowly behind
Ireland and the Netherlands. House prices were almost 30% higher than could be
explained by fundamental factors such as disposable income, interest rates and
working-age population . . . The reality was that the market was lifted artificially
high by a tide of cheap credit.
99 Id.
100 Hillary Osbourne, Credit Crunch: Nationwide predicts House Price Falls Into 2010,
GUARDIAN, Nov. 10, 2008.
101 FinFacts, UK House Prices Fell at the Fastest Rate in At Least 25 Years in October,
Nov. 6, 2008, http://www.fmfacts.ie/irishfmancenews/article_1015190.shtml.
102 Subprime Lawsuits On Pace To Top S&L Cases, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 15, 2008,
available at
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("HOEPA") is specifically designed to combat predatory lending.10 3 This
act has been in place since 1994, but it has recently been infused with
tougher requirements for specific loans.'0 Other federal agencies have
taken actions, sometimes jointly, under various federal consumer protection
laws, to bring actions against mortgage lenders and brokers who may have
engaged in unfair or deceptive lending practices. For example, The Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC") has played a prominent enforcement role,
filing 19 complaints and reaching multimillion dollar settlements.'05 In
addition, the Departments of Justice ("DOJ") and HUD have entered into
predatory lending-related settlements using laws such as the Fair Housing
Act and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act. 06
Federal banking regulators, including the Federal Reserve Board,
report little evidence of predatory lending by the institutions they
supervise. 107 However, on September 23, 2008, government officials
reported that the Federal Bureau of Investigation was looking into the
possibility of fraud by mortgage financing companies Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac. 0 8  States have also strengthened regulation of lenders and
brokers. As of January 2004, twenty-five states had passed laws to address
the problems of predatory lending, utilizing such measures as restricting
terms or provisions of certain high-cost loans, or instituting more stringent
licensing requirements.'
In the United Kingdom, lawsuits arising from the housing crisis have
also commenced and multiplied recently."o In a landmark case, a
homeowner who was charged 9,000 British pounds in early repayment fees
103 U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, Consumer Protection: Federal and State Agencies
Face Challenges in Combating Predatory Lending, GAO-04-280, Jan. 30, 2004, available at
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-280.
104 The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994 (HOEPA or the Act)
amended TILA by adding Section 129 of TILA, 15 U.S.C. § 1639, and has been
implemented by Sections 226.31 and 226.32 of Regulation Z. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.31 and
226.32. HOEPA was implemented to specifically curb the predatory lending practices of
certain sub-prime lenders. Generally, the Act provides added protections to borrowers who
obtain more high-cost loans in the sub-prime market.
105 U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, Consumer Protection, supra note 103.
106 See id.
107 See id.
108 Kelli Arena, FBI Probing Bailout Firms, CNN, Sept. 24, 2008, available at
http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/23/news/companies/fbifinance/index.htm.
10 U.S. Gov't Accountability Office Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, Report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Consumer Protection:
Federal and State Agencies Face Challenges in Combating Predatory Lending, (Jan. 2004),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04280.pdf.
110 See Anand Doobay, United Kingdom: What The Increase In International Crime





for her mortgage brought the case to the High Court."' The outcome of this
case will likely affect thousands of borrowers who similarly face exorbitant
prepayment fees, of which they were not aware when they signed for their
mortgages.1 2 There exists a fundamental question at the base of the case:
Who has responsibility for non-disclosed or inadequately-disclosed terms
on a mortgage, the unsophisticated borrower or the business-minded
lender?" 3 The plaintiff in the case stated that the mortgage lender did not
point out the prepayment penalty when she signed her mortgage.114
The FSA addresses these practices on its website, but the question has
not been litigated in the High Court as of yet. The FSA states that "[m]ost
major lenders have opted either to charge a fee that cannot be varied during
the lifetime of the mortgage, or to remove the fee altogether. . . The fee
should only vary for valid reasons clearly explained at the outset"
(emphasis added)."'
The FSA has also launched a "Campaign Against Mortgage Fraud,"
increasing their supervisory focus on enforcement in the industry. 16 A new
Enforcement Division works to ban intermediaries who have been
implicated in mortgage fraud, whether by individuals or groups."' As of
2008, the FSA has banned twenty mortgage brokers and other involved in
submitting false applications."8 Perpetrators face not only bans but heavy
fines and the possibility of forced disgorgement of ill-gotten gains. 1 9
III. CURRENT LANDSCAPE OF RESPONSIBLE LENDING
PRACTICES
The response to the market meltdown in both countries has been
extensive. Amendments to regulations already in place have been the route
taken by U.S. governmental agencies, whereas transparency policies are
already in place in the United Kingdom. There, they have focused more on
liquidity and the credit portion of the crisis, rather than revamp their lending
policies.120 In the following section, we examine the changes in the United
"' Martin Shipton, Mortgage Fees Face Test in Landmark Welch Case, WESTERN MAIL,
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States in response to the crisis and contrast these efforts with the response
in the United Kingdom.
A. HUD Changes and 11th Circuit Decision
In 2007, a group of borrowers appealed a lower court decision to deny
their class action suit against a mortgage lender, Premiere Mortgage
Company, alleging that the lender's payment of yield spread premiums
("YSPs") to mortgage brokers in exchange for delivering interest rates
above "par rate" violated the recently-enacted Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act ("RESPA").121  The 11th Circuit affirmed the lower court
finding, in that YSPs did not violate the RESPA.122 The Court held that
brokers were providing a real service to lenders for which they were owed
compensation, and the total amount of such compensation was reasonable
in light of the services that these brokers provided.123 This holding, which
was the first time the Court directly addressed the widespread use of YSPs
to compensate brokers, seems to assure this particular structure of lender-
broker payments a long, fruitful life.
YSPs are points paid by lenders for loans carrying interest rates above
the par rate.124 Although YSPs provide a useful option to some borrowers
(i.e., those with little cash may pay a higher YSP to obtain a no-cost
mortgage in which the settlement costs are paid by the lender), they overall
increase costs to all borrowers. 125 The position taken by HUD, which
administers RESPA, is that although the Act prohibits referral fees, YSPs
are considered legal so long as they are reasonably related to the value of
services provided to the borrower by the broker. 126 This position, affirmed
by the 11th Circuit in Culpepper, leads to the widespread acceptability of
YSPs and reveals, once again, the reluctance of the United States to
standardize mortgage pricing as in the United Kingdom. 127
In November of 2008, HUD issued a long list of additional mortgage
reforms that essentially requires lenders and mortgage brokers to provide
lenders with a standard Good Faith Estimate ("GFE") which will clearly
disclose key loan terms and closing costs.128 These final rules address a
Housing-Forecast.
121 Culpepper v. Irwin Mortgage Corp., 491 F.3d 1260, 1263 (11" Cir. 2007).
122 See id.
123 See id. at 1273-74.
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slew of comment letters received by HUD in response to their proposed
changes to RESPA, including a four-page GFE.12 9 The new rules require a
much shorter and simpler GFE, which will tell borrowers the following
information: loan term, interest rate (i.e., fixed or variable), pre-payment
penalties, balloon payments, and total closing costs.13 0 These upfront
disclosures will go into effect January 1, 2010. Some argue that these
new rules will be the end of mortgage brokerage, as industry trade groups
bemoan the increase in cost and clumsiness of the new rules.
B. Federal Reserve Board Releases Amendments to Regulation
In July of 2008, the Federal Reserve Board approved a final rule for
home mortgage loans to better protect consumers and promote responsible
lending.133 Lenders initiated over 550,000 foreclosures in the first quarter
of 2008, about half of which were on subprime mortgages. 134 The sharp
increase in delinquencies and foreclosures in the housing market since 2006
prompted the Federal Reserve Board to take new action by implementing a
finalized set of rules amending Regulation Z (also known as Truth in
Lending Act). 135 The new rules affect mortgage lenders of any size and
took effect October 1, 2009, with the exception of the new escrow
requirement which will be phased in during 2010.136
These highly anticipated changes strive to place more and better
information in the hands of potential borrowers earlier in the process,
facilitating more responsible and informed lending and borrowing. In
finalizing the changes, the Federal Reserve Board took into account
comments from across the entire industry including community banks,
consumer banking trade associations, and mortgage banking trade
associations.137 Under the new amendments, all mortgage lenders could be
impacted.13 8 Four of the recent rules apply specifically to "high-priced
loans," which have been newly redefined as first-lien mortgages with an
APR of 1.5% above the Federal Reserve Board's "average prime offer
rate," as well as subordinated loans that are 3.5% over this rate (this updates




132 See Jack Guttentag, Reform May Mean End of Mortgage Broker Deception is Near,
DAILY HERALD, Sept. 6, 2008, http://www.dailyherald.com/story/print/?id=232905.
133 Press Release, Federal Reserve Board, July 14, 2008,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressIbcreg/20080714a.htm.
134 See, e.g., Federal Register, Part III, Federal Reserve System, 12 CFR Part 226, Truth
in Lending, Final Rule, Sections 226.4, 226.5, 226.17, 226.18, 226.30.
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treasury rate).139 Three other rules address all closed-end mortgages
secured by a principal dwelling.140
The new rules purport to focus on transparency and verification, but
emphasize such changes for loans traditionally considered subprime, with
less concern for prime loans.14' Here again, perhaps the focus of the
regulatory changes should be on restructuring the lender-broker
relationship. Changes apply to two loan categories: "high-priced loans" and
closed-end loans secured by a principal dwelling.142 If lending institutions
write any loans that qualify as "high-priced" on or after October 1, 2009,
more information pertinent to repayment ability will have to be considered
beyond just the value of the underlying home. "43 In addition, evaluation of
a borrower's financial position must now include verification of the
applicant's income and existing assets, prepayment penalties will no longer
be allowed if the monthly payment amount can potentially change within
the first four years of repayment, and creditors will have to establish escrow
accounts to reserve for property taxes and homeowner's insurance
payments.'"
For closed-end loans secured by a principal dwelling, changes are less
groundbreaking. For example, creditors and mortgage brokers are
prohibited from coercing appraisers into misstating home values. 145 In
addition, new regulations for loan servicing require lenders to credit
payments to a consumer's account as of the date received, and prohibit
"pyramiding" late fees (pyramiding occurs when consumers make full and
timely payments but are still assessed late fees on previously accrued and
unpaid late fees.)146 Lenders must also provide timely and accurate payoff
statements if requested; and creditors must now deliver early mortgage loan
disclosures to consumers no later than three business days after application,
and before any fee is paid, other than a fee for obtaining the consumer's
credit history. 1 Under current fee structures, borrowers are often deterred
from looking elsewhere after paying significant application or origination
fees.148
There are several inadequacies to these amendments passed by the
Federal Reserve Board. Notably, these amendments to Regulation Z do not














United Kingdom.14 9 No mention is made of increased standardization of
broker fees or enhanced disclosure of wholesale loan prices.5 o In fact, the
Federal Reserve Board withdrew its proposal to "require servicers to deliver
a fee schedule to consumers upon request; and its proposal to prohibit
creditors from paying a mortgage broker more than the consumer had
agreed in advance that the broker would receive." 5' Instead, the Federal
Reserve Board focused on increasing disclosures to consumers about their
own repayment obligations and the true nature of the interest rate they
face.152 Although tightening up mortgage loan disclosures in the United
States could assist some borrowers to better understand the costs and terms
of their loans, some argue that such efforts may have an immaterial impact
on decreasing the incidence of predatory lending. 153
Secondly, the inherent complexity of mortgage terms is an inevitable
source or opportunity for exploiting the unsuspecting borrower.154 Some
argue that even a relatively clear and transparent system of disclosures still
not help borrowers who lack sophistication about financial matters, are not
highly educated, or suffer physical or mental infirmities.'5s However, it is
clear from looking at the state of the housing market in the United
Kingdom, with their relatively transparent system, that there is room for
improvement in the United States. Although a good start, the amendments
focus too narrowly on the subprime market, or the newly defined "high-
priced loan" market. The Federal Reserve Board was perhaps overly
concerned with the cost burden of compliance for these new disclosure
requirements and thus wished to exclude the prime market:
The Board stated in connection with the proposal a general principle
that new regulations should be applied as broadly as needed to
protect consumers from actual or potential injury, but not so broadly
that the costs, including the always-present risk of unintended
consequences, would clearly outweigh the benefits. Consistent with
this principle, the Board believes, as it stated in connection with the
proposal, that the stricter regulations of § 226.35 should cover the
subprime market and generally exclude the prime market. 56
149 See id
15o See Truth in Lending Final Rule, 12 C.F.R. § 226 (July 30, 2008).
151 Id. at 44523.
152 See Truth in Lending Final Rule, 12 C.F.R. § 226 (July 30, 2008).
153 U.S. Gov't Accountability Office Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, Report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Consumer Protection:
Federal and State Agencies Face Challenges in Combating Predatory Lending, at 102, (Jan.
2004) available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04280.pdf.
154 See id.
1ss See Id.
156 See Federal Reserve System, Final Rule, Official Staff Commentary, 70 Fed. Reg.
147, 44522, 44524 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 226) supra note 35.
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In light of such changes, it does not seem that the mortgage brokerage
system in the United States will receive the overhaul it needs once the rules
of amended Regulation Z come into effect. The increased transparency in
subprime lending is a step in the right direction, but does not solve many of
the issues with the mortgage brokerage scheme in the current market.
C. United Kingdom: Responses to Market Meltdown
The split of responsibilities between the Treasury, Bank of England
and FSA implemented by Gordon Brown in 1997 spread the supervisory
responsibility of the mortgage industry to more entities, but arguably laid
the foundations of a weaker regulatory framework by making it tougher for
authorities to act nimbly and take timely action in the face of crisis. 1 7 In
light of the recent crisis, some changes have been instituted at the FSA."'
Changes include further tightening of their regulatory focus in response to
the world financial crisis. 9 There is very little commentary related to
tightening of disclosure requirements or mortgage broker practices,
however, there is further evidence that the United Kingdom already has a
strong and opaque regulatory scheme in place to oversee the mortgage
market.
IV. CONCLUSION
Whatever the best model for selling practices may be, it is clear that
mortgage brokers in this post-subprime meltdown world must evolve with
the times; regulation of the industry in the United States must keep pace
with the times.160 Improved regulation of their selling practices may be just
the ticket. 161 The U.K. model, which takes a harder line at lending
regulation and requirements, is more effective than that of the United States
in controlling brokers and informing borrowees. 162 Regardless of the exact
157 See The Politics of Printing Money, THE TIMES, Mar. 6, 2009,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/leading article/article5854306.ece (describing
that the tripartite system of financial responsibility did not help to stave off the
comprehensive failure of policy, regulation and institutions in the United Kingdom in recent
years).
158 Mark Kleinman, FSA Chairman Lord Turner Expects the City to Recover From
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structure that emerges, increased exposure will compel lenders to maintain
tighter control over credit quality.16 1
Although an onslaught of regulatory reform has occurred in the United
States in the past year in response to the subprime crisis and the mortgage
meltdown, the eventual impact of such changes in regulation may still come
up short in solving the real problems of the current mortgage brokerage
system. While the value of mortgage brokers is undisputed, the
standardization of their fees and the pricing structure in the place in the
United Kingdom is a more responsible and honest approach to mortgage
pricing. The impact of the U.S. crisis has been felt globally, but the more
immediate recovery prospects predicted in the United Kingdom versus that
in the United States is just one indication of the inherent flaws in the
regulatory scheme in the United States. Increasing the requirements for
transparency through standardization of retail and wholesale price
disclosures of mortgages, like the system in the U.K, would undoubtedly
prove beneficial in the United States as well.
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